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CHARITABLE IMMUNITY: WHAT PRICE HATH CHARITY?
Barbara Ann Williams*
It is well settled in Virginia that charitable organizations are
immune from liability arising from tort claims asserted by per-
sons who accept the organizations' charitable benefits.1 The
determination of whether a plaintiff is the beneficiary of chari-
table bounty is a legal issue for the court to decide.2 Although
most older Virginia cases discuss charitable immunity as it
applies to hospitals, the doctrine has been applied to many
other types of charitable organizations.3
Over the years, the doctrine of charitable immunity has be-
come firmly embedded in Virginia law as well as
Commonwealth's general public policy.4 Although several states
have abolished charitable immunity by judicial fiat, the Virginia
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that abolition of the doc-
trine requires action by the General Assembly.5 Thus far, the
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1. Weston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 601, 107 S.E. 785, 790
(1921).
2. Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 711, 133 S.E.2d 559, 565 (1963).
3. See, e.g., Roberts v. Wesley Found., 27 Va. Cir. 121 (Williamsburg 1992) (ap-
plying doctrine to a charitable organization that leased its kitchen and meeting space
to the Peninsula Agency on Aging, which sponsored a lunch program for elderly peo-
ple); Stayton v. American Legion Battlefield Post No. 144, 18 Va. Cir. 387 (Henrico
County 1990) (applying doctrine to Women's Auxiliary of Post); Langston v. American
Red Cross, 18 Va. Cir. 451 (Virginia Beach 1990); Boan v. Peninsula YMCA, 18 Va.
Cir. 145 (Newport News 1989) (applying the doctrine of charitable immunity to
YMCA that sponsored a summer camp and allowed paying guests to use its basket-
ball court).
4. Memorial Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 885, 108 S.E.2d 388, 396 (1959) (hold-
ing that where a charitable institution has exercised due care in employing its staff,
the institution is not liable to the beneficiaries of the charity for its torts).
5. Id. at 889, 108 S.E.2d at 396.
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legislature has refused to abolish the charitable immunity ex-
ception as it applies to charitable hospitals.6
Although the doctrine of charitable immunity is still viable in
Virginia, several recent judicial pronouncements greatly limit
its scope. For example, in Thrasher v. Winand,7 the court held
that a non-profit Virginia corporation named "Mountain Magic"
was not entitled to charitable immunity. According to the court,
the group's charitable purpose was too broad, conferring "indi-
rect benefits which [were] too remote to give rise to the defense
of charitable immunity."8
Mountain Magic's stated corporate purpose "was to organize
and promote an annual 'Spring Festival' in Buchanan, [Virgin-
ia,] to engage in other community activities, and to donate its
net earnings to local charities."9 The plaintiff, a member of
"Purgatory Four Wheelers," a four-wheel-drive truck club that
participated in the Spring Festival sponsored by Mountain Mag-
ic,' ° was injured when his motorcycle collided with a truck
traveling on a road partially barricaded for the festival. Accord-
ing to the plaintiff, the placement of the barricades contributed
to the collision."
Although Mountain Magic's charitable nature was undisput-
ed,'2 the court rejected Mountain Magic's charitable immunity
argument. The court explained that although the plaintiff took
part in his club's activities at the festival and was eligible to
receive Mountain Magic's charitable benefits, he was not a
beneficiary. According to the court, the only beneficiaries of
Mountain Magic's charitable benefits were those to whom
Mountain Magic donated the proceeds of fundraising activities.
Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff did not become a
vicarious beneficiary through his membership in Purgatory or
his participation in Purgatory's activities at the festival."
Moreover, the court ruled that "mere membership in a class
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
7. 239 Va. 338, 389 S.E.2d 699 (1990).
8. Id. at 342, 389 S.E.2d at 701.
9. Id. at 339, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 340, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 341, 389 S.E.2d at 701.
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eligible to receive future benefits, conditioned upon circumstanc-
es which might never occur, is too remote and speculative to be
considered."14 In other words, the plaintiffs potential beneficia-
ry status was too remote a possibility to trigger the doctrine of
charitable immunity.
Thrasher heralded a trend in Virginia toward a more restric-
tive definition of beneficiaries for charitable immunity purposes.
This trend was continued in Straley v. Urbanna Chamber of
Commerce.5 In Straley, the plaintiff alleged that she was in-
jured at the Urbanna Oyster Festival when a piece of candy
thrown by a clown struck her in the eye. The plaintiff sued the
Urbanna Chamber of Commerce, the Urbanna Oyster Festival
Committee, and the town of Urbanna for failing to promulgate
proper rules and regulations for the behavior of parade partici-
pants, and for failing to supervise the participants properly."
It was undisputed that the Urbanna Chamber of Commerce
is a nonprofit corporation organized for a charitable purpose. 7
The Chamber of Commerce's principal source of revenue is the
Oyster Festival, the proceeds of which are used to pay the
Chamber's operating expenses and contribute to a number of
local charitable causes. 8 The plaintiff participated in all of the
Oyster Festival events. Nevertheless, the court held that the
plaintiff "did not become a vicarious beneficiary" of the Cham-
ber of Commerce's charity as a result of her participation in the
festival activities. 9
The court further concluded that because the plaintiff lived
sixty-two miles from the town and received no pecuniary bene-
fits from the funds generated by the festival or contributed by
the Chamber of Commerce to local charities, 0 she was not a
beneficiary of the Chamber's purpose for conducting the festival.
In the court's words: "The relationship between the Chamber
and the plaintiff, a member of the public attending the festival,
14. Id. at 342, 389 S.E.2d at 701.
15. 243 Va. 32, 413 S.E.2d 47 (1992).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 33-34, 413 S.E.2d at 48.
18. Id. at 34, 413 S.E.2d at 48-49.
19. Id. at 37, 413 S.E.2d at 50 (quoting Thrasher, 239 Va. at 341, 389 S.E.2d at
701).
20. Id. at 37, 413 S.E.2d at 50-51.
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is too attenuated and indirect to classify her as a beneficiary of
the Chamber's charitable activities. She was a mere invitee to
whom the defendants owed the duty of reasonable care."2'
Thrasher and Straley make it abundantly clear that to be
considered a charitable beneficiary for the purposes of charita-
ble immunity, a person must be a direct beneficiary through
the receipt of money, goods, or services, and not merely some-
one who indirectly receives charitable benefits. Association with
a charity's activities or eligibility to receive charitable benefits
in the future is insufficient. This represents a significant
change in Virginia law.'
In addition to imposing tighter limits on the scope of the
definition of "charitable beneficiary," courts have begun to look
past the "magic words" of charitable intent recited in the corpo-
rate charters of many nonprofit organizations. Instead, courts
will examine how the organizations are actually run.' The
most recent example of this trend is Davidson v. The Colonial
Williamsburg Foundation.'
The plaintiff in Davidson was a visitor at Colonial
Williamsburg who fell while exiting her car which was parked
near the Visitor Center. She commenced a negligence action
against the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation seeking damages
for her resulting injuries. The Foundation moved for summary
judgment on the ground that it was immune from suit under
the doctrine of charitable immunity.'
21. Id. at 37, 413 S.E.2d at 51.
22. Cf Egerton v. R.E. Lee Memorial Church, 395 F.2d 381, 384 (4th Cir. 1968).
In Egerton, the court held that a plaintiff injured on church premises was a benefi-
ciary of the church's charitable purpose. Although plaintiff was not a member of the
church and her injury occurred while she was visiting as a tourist and not as a wor-
shipper, plaintiff partook of the church's spiritual function and services by visiting it.
Id. See also Taylor v. American Natl Red Cross, 8 Va. Cir. 108 (Norfolk 1984) (hold-
ing plaintiff, who voluntarily donated blood to the Red Cross, was not a stranger to
the organization's charitable benefits because she and her family were eligible to
receive in the future, at no cost, any needed blood or blood products from the Red
Cross).
23. See, e.g., Danville Community Hosp. v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 753, 43
S.E.2d 882, 884 (1947) ("[W]hether a hospital is charitable or otherwise . . . may be
determined not only from the powers and purposes as defined in its articles of incor-
poration or charter but also from the manner in which it is conducted.").
24. 817 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1993).
25. Id. at 612.
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The court denied the Foundation's motion. In doing so, the
court noted that while the doctrine of charitable immunity has
been widely criticized, and indeed abandoned or sharply cur-
tailed by many states, it enjoys "continuing vitality in Virgin-
ia."' The court, however, also observed that "Virginia has fa-
vored a limited form of immunity that does not exempt charita-
ble organizations from all tort liability."27
Thus, the court's first inquiry was whether the Foundation
was "charitable" in the context of tort immunity. Factors cited
by the court as relevant to this determination were:
(1) whether the organization's charter limits it to charitable
or eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization's
charter contains a "not for profit" limitation; (3) whether
the organization's goal is to break even; (4) whether the
organization earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or
surplus must be used for charitable or eleemosynary pur-
poses; (6) whether the organization depends on contribu-
tions and donations for its existence; (7) whether the orga-
nization provides its services free of charge to those unable
to pay; and (8) whether the directors and officers receive
compensation.'
The court cautioned that these factors are illustrative, not ex-
haustive, and that no one factor is dispositive."
Measured against the above factors, the court in Davidson
concluded that even though the Foundation's 1990 charter artic-
ulated a charitable purpose and the Foundation was entitled to
federal income tax exemption for some of its activities, it could
not be characterized as "charitable.""0 The court made four
findings. First, the Foundation's articles in effect in 1990 did
not state that the Foundation operated exclusively "not-for-prof-
it.""' Second, the Foundation enjoyed an operating surplus in
four of the previous five years." Third, the Foundation was no
26. Id. at 612-13.
27. Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 614.
29. Id.
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longer dependent on contributions for its existence.' Fourth,
the Foundation paid significant salaries to its chief executive
and other officers.' Based upon these findings, the court de-
termined that the Foundation was not entitled to charitable
immunity and, therefore, did not consider the issue of whether
plaintiff was a beneficiary of the Foundation at the time of her
accident.3"
Davidson, coupled with Thrasher and Straley, reveal that
non-profit organizations will no longer be cloaked with
charitable immunity simply because they are ostensibly
"charitable organizations." Recreational organizations, historical
associations, community programs, church groups and other
"charitable" entities, especially those that conduct their activi-
ties in a business-like manner and generate significant income,
should be on notice that their non-profit status may be scruti-
nized more closely now than in the past. Moreover, unless the
organization can show that a claimant received a direct benefit
from its activities, charitable immunity may not shield it from
tort liability.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 617.
35. Id.
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